Under Review
"Democratic Transitions and International Conflict"
How do transitions to democracy affect international conflict? I argue that democratic transitions are likely to reduce conflict, on average. Prior to transitions occurring, autocratic regimes face incentives to develop constraining institutions to credibly commit to providing concessions as dictators get weaker. After transitioning, these institutions are likely to grow stronger and more visible, further enhancing effective costly signaling. At the same time, democratic transitions can rapidly incorporate women's preferences for more cooperative foreign policy into the policymaking process. Time-series cross-sectional matching and difference-in-differences estimation allows me to test a variety of implications of my argument with credible causal inference. Pooling across three- and five-year periods after transition, democratic transitions reduce conflict, including fatal conflicts. In addition, I find similar patterns with respect to constraining institutions, women's suffrage, and women's political influence, which are consistent with the broader theoretical argument.
Status: Invited to R&R at International Interactions. Link to paper. Presented at: 2022 Midwest Political Science Association Annual Conference.
"Don't Stand by Silently and Watch: How Shaming Can Encourage Compliance with Human Rights Norms"
When countries name and shame does this generate a backlash and lead to greater public support for governments accused of violent repression? I argue that this is not the case; instead, shaming can reduce support for repressive governments by increasing the public’s anger toward their government. Using a preregistered survey experiment in the Philippines, I find that shaming reduces public support for the government and human rights abuses. These findings hold among individuals with high levels of national attachment, a group previously thought to be prone to a backlash effect. Shaming's effect on anger, in particular anger toward the government, appears to play an important mediating role. Furthermore, there is little evidence that exposure to shaming increases the public’s belief that there will be internationally imposed costs, a mechanism frequently identified in prior research. Taken together, this study suggests that shaming can be an effective tool for human rights diplomacy.
Status: Under Review. Link to paper. Presented at: 2025 International Studies Association Annual Conference Early Career Workshop, 2025 Midwest Political Science Association Annual Conference, and 2025 American Political Science Association Annual Conference.
Working Papers
"The Limits of Denying Atrocities"
How do public denials in response to accusations of human rights abuses affect public opinion within countries targeted by international criticism? I develop a theory of public responses to denial by incorporating insights from social psychology, including self-categorization theory and social identity theory. My theory predicts that denial will generate a backlash effect -- increasing support for the leader, while reducing support for international cooperation -- when the national identity is highly salient or when the leader is broadly popular. I test observable implications from my theory using a novel between-subjects, vignette survey experiment in the Philippines. I find that the leader's denial does not meaningfully change public opinion in response to criticism from the United States, and that this result is not moderated individual-level differences in social identity. I attribute this null result to the long history of bilateral cooperation between the U.S. and the Philippines. The results of this study suggest strong scope conditions on when leaders will be able to alter public opinion in response to shaming. They also suggest that allies can shaming suspected human rights abuses without suffering strategic costs in some circumstances.
Status: Working Paper. Presented at: 2024 International Studies Association Annual Conference, 2024 Elections, Public Opinion, and Voting Behavior Annual Conference, 2023 American Political Science Association Annual Conference.
"Democratic Backsliding and Support for Alliance Commitments" (with Caroline Robbins)
How do regime transitions and regime type affect democratic state's willingness to uphold their alliances? In this paper, we argue that democratic backsliding are uniquely dangerous to alliance stability. In contrast to the existing literature on alliance stability, our theory predicts different outcomes for alliance stability depending on whether a regime transitions results in a democracy or an autocracy. We expect that democratic backsliding is likely to reduce public support for maintaining alliance commitments by reducing both the perceived benefits of the alliance and the reputational costs of abandoning an ally. We test key implications of our argument using a pair of large-n survey experiments in the United States. In the first experiment, we find that (1) both regime transitions and regime type affect public support for using military force to keep alliance commitments, and (2) transitions to autocracy generate far less stable alliances than transitions to democracy. The second survey experiment explores possible mechanisms driving this effect, including perceptions of reliability and compatibility, and perceived reputational costs.
Status: Working Paper. Presented at: 2025 Midwest Political Science Association Annual Conference.
"Past Actions and Interstate Conflict" ( with Mark Souva)
A growing consensus that a state's reputation for resolve is a crucial factor in determining the success of deterrence. In turn, this consensus may justify pursuing a costly conflict to deter future aggression. In this paper, we argue that there is little evidence to suggest that a 'bad' reputation for resolve is linked to deterrence failure. Using stratification, we show that the results of previous studies are driven largely by extrapolation. Correcting for this limitation, we show that backing down in a conflict is not associated with deterrence failure in the future. Then, using a time-series cross-sectional matching and difference-in-differences approach, we show that backing down can reduce conflict in certain sub-groups, including dyads in which the target is much weaker than the initiator. This study has important implications for understanding the effects of possible U.S. responses to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, as well as the use of parametric models to study questions where key variables of interest are sparse.
Status: Working Paper. Presented at: 2023 Midwest Political Science Association Annual Conference.
"The Legacy of Slavery and Group Attitudes Towards International Conflict"
How does the legacy of violent political and economic institutions shape international cooperation? Building on a growing area of research examining the long-term effects of political violence, I argue that a strong legacy of political violence is likely to reduce international security cooperation. I examine this hypothesis using the case of US security cooperation with the UN, and the legacy of slavery in the US South. I find that Southern whites in places with a stronger legacy of slavery are substantially less likely to support security cooperation with the UN, across a variety of model specifications and identification strategies. I explore multiple potential mechanisms including sovereignty concerns, modern-day partisanship, racial resentment, economic underdevelopment, and isolationism.
Status: Working Paper. Link to working paper. Presented at: 2023 Midwest Political Science Association Annual Conference.
Ongoing Projects
"Clash of Ideologies: How U.S. and Chinese Public Diplomacy Shapes Public Opinion in Southeast Asia" (with Nico Ravanilla)
"AI and Soft Power" (with Kelly Matush)
"Does Naming and Shaming Increase Public Support for Keeping Climate Change Commitments?'' (with Carlisle Rainey)
"Regression Adjustment in Survey Experiments: A Practical Perspective" (with Carlisle Rainey and Winston Lin)