Under Review
"Democratic Transitions and International Conflict"
How do transitions to democracy affect international conflict? I argue that democratic transitions are likely to reduce conflict, on average. Prior to transitions occurring, autocratic regimes face incentives to develop constraining institutions to credible commit to providing concessions as dictators get weaker. After transitioning, these institutions are likely to grow stronger and more visible, further enhancing effective costly signaling. At the same time, democratic transitions can rapidly incorporate women's preferences for more cooperative foreign policy into the policymaking process. Time-series cross-sectional matching and difference-in-differences estimation allows me to test a variety of implications of my argument with credible causal inference. Pooling across three- and five-year periods after transition, democratic transitions reduce conflict, including fatal conflicts. In addition, I find similar patterns with respect to constraining institutions, women's suffrage, and women's political influence, which are consistent with the broader theoretical argument.
Status: Under Review. Link to paper. Presented at: 2022 Midwest Political Science Association Annual Conference.
Working Papers
"Don't Stand by Silently and Watch: How Shaming Can Encourage Compliance with Human Rights Norms"
Countries often confront mass atrocities by naming and shaming transgressive governments. Does shaming improve compliance with human rights norms or contribute to a backlash? Country-level theories of shaming generate opposing predictions as to how shaming is likely to affect public opinion. To better explain these opposing predictions, I focus on two different mechanisms: internationally-imposed costs of repression and anger. A preregistered survey experiment in the Philippines tests the effects of shaming on (1) support for the government, (2) support for human rights, (3) perceptions of anticipated costs imposed by other countries, and (4) feelings of anger. I find that shaming reduces public support for the government and human rights abuses. These findings hold even among members of the public that are previously thought to be prone to a backlash effect. Shaming's effect on anger appears to play an important role in linking shaming to changes in public opinion, while shaming's effect on perceptions of costs from other countries does not.
Status: Working Paper. Presented at: 2025 International Studies Association Annual Conference Early Career Workshop (Accepted)
"The Legacy of Slavery and Group Attitudes Towards International Conflict"
How does the legacy of violent political and economic institutions shape international cooperation? Building on a growing area of research examining the long-term effects of political violence, I argue that a strong legacy of political violence is likely to reduce international security cooperation. I examine this hypothesis using the case of US security cooperation with the UN, and the legacy of slavery in the US South. I find that Southern whites in places with a stronger legacy of slavery are substantially less likely to support security cooperation with the UN, across a variety of model specifications and identification strategies. I explore multiple potential mechanisms including sovereignty concerns, modern-day partisanship, racial resentment, economic underdevelopment, and isolationism.
Status: Working Paper. Link to working paper. Presented at: 2023 Midwest Political Science Association Annual Conference.
"Leader Denial and Backlash to Naming and Shaming: Evidence from a Survey Experiment in the Philippines"
How do public denials in response to accusations of human rights abuses affect public opinion within countries targeted by international criticism? I develop a theory of public responses to denial by incorporating insights from social psychology, including self-categorization theory and social identity theory. My theory predicts that denial will generate a backlash effect -- increasing support for the leader, while reducing support for international cooperation -- when the national identity is highly salient or when the leader is broadly popular. I test observable implications from my theory using a novel between-subjects, vignette survey experiment in the Philippines. I find that the leader's denial does not meaningfully change public opinion in response to criticism from the United States, and that this result is not moderated individual-level differences in social identity. I attribute this null result to the long history of bilateral cooperation between the U.S. and the Philippines. The results of this study suggest strong scope conditions on when leaders will be able to alter public opinion in response to shaming. They also suggest that allies can shaming suspected human rights abuses without suffering strategic costs in some circumstances.
Status: Working Paper. Presented at: 2024 International Studies Association Annual Conference, 2024 Elections, Public Opinion, and Voting Behavior Annual Conference, 2023 American Political Science Association Annual Conference.
Ongoing Projects
"Leave Your (Liberal) Shoes at the Door: How the United States' and China's Public Diplomacy Rhetoric is Shaping Public Opinion and Driving Great Power Competition in Southeast Asia" (with Nico Ravanilla)
"Past Actions and Interstate Conflict" ( with Mark Souva)
`"Does Naming and Shaming Increase Public Support for Keeping Climate Change Commitments?'' with Carlisle Rainey
"Regression Adjustment in Survey Experiments: A Practical Perspective" (with Carlisle Rainey and Winston Lin)
"Regime Transitions and Support for Alliance Commitments" (with Caroline Robbins)
"The Generalizability of Shaming across Issue Areas" (with Lotem Bassan-Nygate and Carlisle Rainey)
"Denial and International Responses to Mass Atrocities"
"Counterfactuals and Inference with Panel Data"